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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the role of secondary property ownership (SPO) in
Europe (EU). Focusing predominantly on residential properties used as rental-
investments, it explores their role in the political economy of housing and
welfare, contributing to respectively newer and older literatures about hous-
ing wealth and asset-based welfare and the ‘really big trade-off’ between out-
right homeownership and generous pensions. Both have hitherto largely
been viewed as related to ownership of the primary residence. The empirical
part of this paper is based on the Household Finance and Consumption
Survey (HFCS), carried out by the European Central Bank in 2014, and providing
information about property ownership by samples of households in 20 member
states of the EU. The results show that the total wealth held in the form of
SPO is considerable while also varying considerably from country to country.
SPO held as an investment in the form of landlordism is most prevalent in
countries characterised as corporatist-conservative or liberal welfare regimes. In
the corporatist-conservative countries, SPO can be seen as a since long estab-
lished proactive asset-based welfare strategy that compensates for the limita-
tions of their fragmented pension systems, especially for the self-employed. In
liberal welfare states, the recent upswing of buy-to-let landlordism is a mani-
festation of the concentration of housing wealth and limited access to home-
ownership for starters, which makes SPO an ever more attractive investment.
KEYWORDS Secondary property ownership; housing wealth; life course; pension; buy-to-let
Introduction
This paper seeks to position secondary property ownership (SPO) in the pol-
itical economy of housing and welfare. In terms of physical form and use,
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SPO ranges from holiday homes in rural and coastal areas to buy-to-let apart-
ments in towns and cities, and from weekend homes for those who work in
a different location than the residential location of their family to inherited
properties in the countryside, sometimes in a different country to the primary
residence. Some are simple structures such as chalets or decayed old farms,
whereas others are top-end properties in historic city centres. What unites
these forms is that they are residential properties that are owned by individu-
als who may also own a primary residence used as their principal residence.
In recent years, housing scholars have become interested in the
characteristics and trends in SPO that link to more general developments in
housing markets and housing policy (Aalbers, Bosma, Fernandez, &
Hochstenbach, 2018; Arundel, 2017; Gibb & Nygaard, 2005; Paccoud, 2017;
Soaita, Searle, McKee, & Moore, 2017). This is not surprising, as an increasing
share of the housing stock fulfils another need than housing for its owner(s),
impacting upon the availability and affordability of the housing stock for
those searching for a home to live in. Two trends catch the eye. First, there
has been recognition of the growth of overseas buyers investing in residen-
tial real estate as ‘safe deposit boxes’ (Fernandez & Aalbers, 2016), or as lucra-
tive rental investment (Aalbers & van Loon, 2017). Second, there has been a
rapid upswing of buy-to-let landlordism in the United Kingdom which has
been related to the emergence of a ‘generation rent’ (Lund, 2013): here, an
increasing share of housing-wealth-rich homeowners is investing in rental
housing for an ever-larger group of young people who, due to their precar-
ious employment situation and borrowing constraints, are not able to afford
high house prices (Arundel, 2017; Mckee, Moore, Soaita, & Crawford, 2017).
The rise of SPO, and buy-to-let landlordism in particular, confront hous-
ing departments in cities across Europe with a question of justice: is it fair
to allow housing market insiders to accumulate additional assets, whilst a
combination of precarious labour market conditions and booming house
prices obstructs an entry into homeownership for young people? Especially
in Britain, but also in the Netherlands, fears have emerged concerning a rise
of a new Fuedal order in which those from non-property-owning families
have no other choice than handing over a large share of their income to
secondary property owners to obtain shelter (Aalbers et al., 2018; Walker &
Jeraj, 2016). However, such analyses lack a comprehensive image of the var-
iety of reasons why individuals obtain secondary properties, and the effect
of various types of SPO on the housing market at large. For some individu-
als, SPO is an intergenerational transfer or a welfare arrangement, whereas
it is a general investment for others (Soaita et al., 2017). An understanding
of the role of SPO in the political economy housing and welfare provides a
necessary basis for approaching country specific regulatory interventions
that are capable of improving the availability and affordability of housing.
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Although there is little comprehensive, harmonised statistical informa-
tion on the size of SPO in Europe, evidence shows considerable cross-coun-
try variation. Most statistical data are derived from ad hoc surveys carried
out at individual country, region and even local levels, which is not surpris-
ing given that most previous research on SPO has focused on its use for
recreation and tourism activities and the impact on the areas in which
these properties are located (see e.g., Gallent, Mace, & Tewdwr-Jones,
2005). Pooling these sources together, it is clear that, at a European level,
SPO constitutes a significant share of the total housing stock. In this
respect, the Nordic countries appear to take the lead with around 30% of
households owning secondary properties (Skak & Bloze, 2017). It is also
established that a major share of the private rental stock in Europe consists
of secondary properties. For example, 60% of the rental housing stock in
Germany is in the hands of small-scale private landlords, as opposed to
institutional landlords such as pension funds, unions or large investors
(Kemp & Kofner, 2010). An international comparative perspective is able to
reveal the role of secondary property ownership and rental income in coun-
tries with different housing regimes and welfare states, explaining how
housing alters the socio-economic position of various groups.
The principal aim of this paper is to develop further the links between
our understanding of SPO and what might be thought of as mainstream
housing research, and specifically with the literature on housing and wel-
fare. In this respect, housing researchers have long pointed to an apparent
trade-off between high (outright) homeownership rates and generous pub-
lic welfare systems (Castles, 1998, Kemeny, 1981). Albeit with some variation
of interpretation, the essence of the trade-off is based on the role of welfare
states as providers of so-called ‘transfer capital’ collected by means of com-
pulsory social contributions that for younger households competes with
the private accumulation of housing wealth (de Swaan, 1989). Older home-
owners are less in need of transfer capital (mostly in the form of a generous
pension) as their tenure provides them with imputed income (low housing
costs in later life) and wealth (possibly used to fulfil welfare needs). These
characteristics of homeownership may be considered as the main engine of
asset-based welfare, leading, some argue, to the reorientation of welfare
states, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries and more recently also in a num-
ber of Nordic countries, in a more productivist and neoliberal direction
(Lennartz, 2017; Malpass, 2008; Ronald, Lennartz, & Kadi, 2017).
The debate about housing and welfare has focused on homeownership
and housing wealth, rather than secondary property ownership, wealth and
rental income. SPO is largely absent from these debates although it might
also generate wealth, and most notably (rental) income, for its owner. In
fact, SPO may have different driving forces among different social groups in
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different countries. Some might invest in secondary properties because
they expect that rental incomes will compensate for their lower pensions in
later life, while other households with higher pensions might invest in sec-
ondary properties for reasons of consumption or further wealth accumula-
tion (Soaita et al., 2017). Moreover, the attractiveness of both strategies can
be seen as dependent on the generosity of the welfare state, including
institutional support for a second-tier pillar of publicly mandated occupa-
tional pensions (De Deken, 2018) and on the extent to which the housing
regime promotes homeownership and/or fosters house price inflation, both
of which contribute to housing wealth accumulation.
A focus on SPO therefore allows us to go beyond understanding of the
links between home ownership and welfare, to investigate how the finan-
cial position of various socio-economic groups within a welfare state
impacts upon their investments in housing beyond primary property own-
ership. This has added significance in that there may be groups that are
comparatively less well-covered by the welfare state that might turn to
investments in secondary properties, while at the same time providing
other households with rental housing. Further, by linking the housing
investments of a share of the population to the trade-off between housing
and welfare, it is possible that different forms of SPO not only impact upon
the financial situation of their owners, but also on the performance of the
housing system as a whole.
This paper begins with a brief review of the literatures on the drivers of
SPO, and on the trade-off between housing and welfare, including asset-
based welfare, and its variation at different locations and across time peri-
ods. It then uses the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS),
carried out by the European Central Bank (ECB) in 2014 using a representa-
tive sample of all households (see ECB, 2016), to provide an examination of
SPO and landlordism in Europe. Following presentation of selected features
of SPO, it focuses on one form of SPO, landlordism, identifying high rates of
landlordism in both conservative-corporatist and liberal regime countries. It
then sets out to understand this pattern by examining; firstly, their housing
systems and, secondly, the nature of their welfare systems that may have
influenced the investment strategies of their households.
Drivers of SPO
A now well-established view of housing is that it constitutes both a con-
sumption good and an investment good. This has been used by Paris
(2010) as the basis for classifying the objectives of those pursuing SPO.
Relating to this, research on the drivers of SPO has mainly focused on its
function as a source of consumption (Gallent et al., 2005). Common
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observations are that people who live in small apartments with limited
access to greenery are more likely to own secondary properties, in order to
compensate for the characteristics of their living environment (Skak &
Bloze, 2017), while older, retired people are more likely to own secondary
properties in order to enjoy nature at a time in their lives when close prox-
imity to work and urban facilities is less needed (Bieger, Beritelli, & Weinert,
2007). Another driver of SPO is the intergenerational support on the hous-
ing market. In this case, family members do not buy secondary homes for
their own consumption, but for family members to live in. Especially in
countries characterised by strongly upward price developments, such as
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the affordability of first-time
homeownership is structurally undermined. To prevent their offspring to
move into – rather expensive – private rental housing, housing-wealth-rich
parents increasingly choose to (co-)finance their children’s first steps on the
housing ladder (Burrows & Lennartz, 2018). Due to the capital gains from
their primary residence, these parents can easily out-bid other households
in the same housing market segment.
As Paris (2010) indicates, however, some SPO may be pursued equally, or
more, because of its investment potential, recognising that this might also
take different forms, specifically as (1) wealth investments or (2) rental
investments. Secondary properties that belong to the first type (wealth
investments) can be purchased solely for that aim (see Fernandez and
Aalbers [2016] for a description of housing as ‘safe deposit box’ for the
transnational elite), or for a combination of housing consumption and
wealth accumulation. The latter category is sub-divided by Paris (2010) into
second/multiple homes, pied-a-terres and non-commercial second homes
(e.g., investments in housing for studying children).
Secondary properties that belong to the second type (rental invest-
ments) are not held for own consumption – for the owner to live in – but
for the rental income they generate. Some forms of SPO, such as family
support, might represent a middle position as they generate rental income,
but are foremost forms of intra-family solidarity. For landlords who pur-
chased secondary properties for their rental income, the literature distin-
guishes two underlying motivations. First, the stable future (retirement)
income flow is pointed out as one of the main reasons (Berry, 2000; Kemp
& Kofner, 2010; Kemp & Rhodes, 1997). Investments in rental housing might
be a strategy to supplement absent or low second-tier pension arrange-
ments1 by those who are poorly covered by these arrangements. Those
who are poorly included in second-tier pension schemes make lower pen-
sion contributions, and therefore have more room to invest in secondary
properties, while, for the same reason, they also have a higher need for
additional income sources in later life (Kemp & Kofner, 2010). Secondly, the
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investment in rental housing might be a strategy to diversify the wealth
portfolio of those who are relatively wealthy anyway and well covered by
second-tier pension arrangements (see Soaita et al. (2017) and Arundel
(2017) for evidence on the nature of buy-to-let in the United Kingdom).
The first type of rental investments can be conceptualised as a supplement
to second-tier pensions, whereas the second type should be seen as a
general investment, or a supplement to the third-tier, that is individual pri-
vate pensions.
A trade-off between housing and welfare?
Whatever the motives of the owners of secondary property might be,
insofar as they are tradable in most circumstances, their properties con-
stitute assets with market values. As such they have the potential to act
as assets that can underlie asset-based welfare. Although these assets
can be used to buffer all kinds of adverse life course events associated
with income falls, they are mostly used to cover income falls after retire-
ment. Exactly how and why asset-based welfare works, depends in part
on what type is being considered; here, a distinction has been made
between three forms: passive, active and proactive (Doling & Ronald,
2010; Ronald & Kadi, 2017).
Passive asset-based welfare
The passive form of asset-based welfare is founded on the notion that
homeownership forms a supplement to collective welfare arrangements
(Ronald & Kadi, 2017). On the macro-level, it is argued that countries trade-
off between high homeownership rates and generous public welfare
arrangements (Castles, 1998; Dewilde & Raeymaekers, 2008; Kemeny, 1981).
Castles (1998) narrowed this to a ‘really big trade-off’ between high
homeownership rates and generous pension arrangements (instead of wel-
fare arrangements in general), arguing that home owners are less in need
of generous pension arrangements as they have low housing costs after
retirement when they have amortised the mortgage. Moreover, homeown-
ers have been less keen on supporting the post-World War II (WWII) expan-
sion of the welfare state, as paying taxes directly competes with mortgage
amortisation. Traditionally, the passive form of asset-based welfare is dom-
inant in Mediterranean countries (Castles & Ferrera, 1996). These countries
have small publicly-mandated first-tier pensions, only aimed at alleviating
poverty during old age. Second-tier, earnings-related pensions, aimed at
preserving the working-life income into old age, are small as well (Ferrera,
1997). As individual contributions to second-tier pensions determine the
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benefits, a trade-off between homeownership and pension might occur at
the individual level as well. In the German-speaking countries, second-tier
publicly-mandated pensions are generous for those who had a stable
labour marker career. In the Scandinavian countries, the coverage of gener-
ous public second-tier is even more universal (Kvist, 1999; Schludi, 2005).
Both the German-speaking and (some) Nordic countries comply with
Castles’ ‘really big trade-off’ as they have preserved and developed a large
rental sector after WWII. In the case of the German-speaking countries it
concerns regulated private rental housing, whereas it concerns public rental
or cooperative housing in the case of the Nordic countries.
Active asset-based welfare
‘Active’ asset-based welfare occurs when housing wealth, rather than
homeownership per se, is used to finance welfare arrangements. At the
micro-level this may be when households liquidate their housing wealth to
sustain their livelihood, perhaps by selling the home (and moving to rental
housing or a smaller home), or by using advanced financial products such
as reverse mortgages to liquidate their housing wealth whilst remaining in
their home. Whilst selling the home to liquidate housing wealth happens
on a very small scale in all European (EU) countries (Costa-Font, Gil, &
Mascarilla, 2010), the use of reverse mortgages is restricted to a small sam-
ple of countries (Doling & Overton, 2007). At the macro-level active asset-
based welfare occurs when pension funds engage with mortgage lending.
In this situation, high, but indebted, homeownership rates and generous
pensions might go hand in hand, as in the Netherlands (Schwartz &
Seabrooke, 2008). Macro-level asset-based welfare is a route out of
Kemeny and Castles’ dichotomy between countries with high homeowner-
ship rates and low pensions, and countries with large rental sectors and
generous pensions. Delfani, De Deken, and Dewilde (2015) argue that a
combination of a commodified housing system and pension system is a
condition for micro-level active asset-based welfare to take place, whereas,
for macro-level active asset-based welfare to take place, only housing
needs to be commodified. As second-tier pensions are publicly mandated
– and therefore decommodified – in nearly all EU countries, micro-level
asset-based welfare is only widespread in countries where reverse mort-
gages are common, such as the United Kingdom, Ireland and Spain
(Doling & Overton, 2007). In a few other countries, with a finance-led
model of homeownership expansion (e.g., the Netherlands, Denmark and
Sweden), one can find macro-level forms of asset-based welfare. High
mortgage debts (between 75% and 115% of the GDP) are mirrored by
large pension savings, accumulated in publicly-mandated occupational
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pension funds. However, a direct link between mortgage debts and pen-
sion savings is often lacking. In countries with macro-level asset-based wel-
fare, the role of housing in the pension system has gradually increased (De
Deken, 2018).
Pro-active asset-based welfare
Underlying both passive and active types of asset-based welfare is the
notion that the housing asset involved is the asset held in the form of
homeownership. Extending on from this, the ‘proactive’ form occurs when
rental income forms a supplement to collective welfare arrangements. In
fact, most rental housing in Europe is in the hands of small-scale landlords,
owning just a few properties (Kemp, 2015). The reasons underlying this are
doubtless complex, but two general strategies can be posited: (1) as a
means of compensating for low first-tier pensions or exclusion from
second-tier pension schemes or (2) as an investment, like any other. In the
latter case, it may involve households that can count on generous second-
tier pension benefits after retirement, for whom rental investments are a
way to diversify their wealth portfolio as a supplement to their third-tier pri-
vate pensions.
The first of these two strategies may be seen in some conservative-cor-
poratist welfare states where many households invest in real estate often in
preference to other types of investments as it is very tangible and consid-
ered a high-confidence asset (De Decker & Dewilde, 2010). Such investment
is often supported by the policy environment. In Germany, Austria and
Switzerland, for example, rents are relatively regulated in lieu for public
subsidies; and this generates stable and predictable returns for investors
(Kemp & Kofner, 2010), whereas in France and Belgium, homeownership
subsidies encourage private households to invest in residential properties
(primary residences and secondary properties) rather than other assets. In
those conservative welfare states that have stratified status-reinforcing
occupational pension schemes, groups that are less-well protected trad-
itionally engaged in landlordism as a supplement to limited first-pillar pen-
sions, and to compensate for limited inclusion in second-tier pensions (De
Decker & Dewilde, 2010; Soaita et al., 2017). This is often the situation fac-
ing self-employed workers in conservative welfare states, who have the
financial means to invest during working life (given that they often pay
lower social contributions), but have low pensions after retirement
(Lohmann, 2009). Although the classic trade-off theory anticipates that con-
servative countries have low homeownership rates and generous pension
benefits, this evidence indicates the critical significance of the stratified
nature of the pension system that may lead to some occupational groups
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investing in rental housing as second-tier pension arrangement, while pro-
viding rental housing for other households. In other words, it is a strategy
opposite to the dominant outcome that gives the conservative welfare
regime its characteristic shape.
In contrast, the upswing of buy-to-let landlordism in the liberal welfare
regime may have very different foundations, more akin to the second strat-
egy. For the United Kingdom, Soaita et al. (2017) indicate that private land-
lordism and buy-to-let activities are mostly a pure investment strategy,
sometimes coupled to intergenerational support. Especially after neo-liberal
housing reforms that have privatised social rental housing, deregulated
rents and eased access to mortgage finance, house prices are inflated and
polarised. This (1) rendered homeownership unaffordable for increasing
numbers of young and low- and medium-income households and (2)
increased housing wealth inequality (Wind, Lersch, & Dewilde, 2017). In
combination with ever more precarious work arrangements among young
individuals, the rising house prices have boosted the demand for rental
housing. As a consequence, investments in housing are more attractive
than other investments such as bonds and stocks. Furthermore, the concen-
tration of wealth amongst those who have been able to disproportionally
profit from house price gains in recent decades has brought this housing-
wealth-rich group into a position to buy additional housing assets, to let
out to households who are financially unable to buy (Arundel, 2017). A
share of investments in rental housing are motivated by intergenerational
support, from housing-wealth-rich parents, to housing-poor children
(Burrows & Lennartz, 2018; Hochstenbach & Boterman, 2015). Although let-
ting out apartments to children is generally a non-profit activity, it often
involves for-profit elements as well, for example, when the property is sim-
ultaneously acquired as a wealth investment, or when additional rental
income is generated by (sub)letting to other individuals than their own chil-
dren. Contrary to those who invest in rental housing in conservative welfare
states, buy-to-let landlords in the United Kingdom may be well-covered by
second-tier pension arrangements, and their investments can be viewed as
providing a supplement to third-tier, private pensions that top up collect-
ive-mandated pensions. In some welfare states that are not part of the lib-
eral cluster, such as the Netherlands, a similar upswing of buy-to-let
landlordism can be witnessed. Aalbers et al. (2018) point out that especially
in the larger cities, where house prices have boomed in recent years, the
buy-to-let sector has tripled in size between 2006 and 2016. Due to the
tightened eligibility for social rental housing and increased unaffordability
of mortgaged homeownership, the demand for private rental housing has
increased. Households that made large capital gains during the house price
boom are able to enter the market as landlords. Where rental properties
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are not in the first place a welfare strategy, the supply seems based on a
capital surplus finding its route towards realisation.
These recent additions to the debate on the trade-off between home-
ownership and pensions contribute to our understanding in at least two
ways. First, they introduce a more nuanced idea of the nature of public wel-
fare arrangements. Pensions are not just ‘low’ or ‘high’. Instead, there might
be large variation regarding the coverage and generosity of first, second
and third-tier pensions for different occupational groups. Second, they
emphasise the conceptual difference between homeownership-based (pas-
sive) welfare and asset-based welfare (active and proactive). The former
provides the basis of the classic ‘big trade-off’, especially occurring in coun-
tries with more collective but less generous public pension systems or for
specific social groups (e.g., the self-employed) that are not well-covered by
the pension system. The latter is most likely to occur in situations in which
pensions are commodified, giving households room to invest in the way
they prefer (Elsinga & Hoekstra, 2015; Lennartz & Ronald, 2017; Ronald
et al., 2017).
Secondary property ownership in Europe
These recent additions to housing debates point to the desirability of devel-
oping greater integration between SPO and (the reasons for) landlordism in
theories of housing and welfare. In this paper we build insights by drawing
on the Household Finance and Consumption Survey that was funded and
carried out by the ECB in 2014 and 2015 in 20 EU countries (Austria [AT],
Belgium [BE], Cyprus [CY], Germany [DE], Estonia [EE], Spain [ES], Finland
[FI], France [FR], Greece [GR], Hungary [HU], Ireland [IE], Italy [IT],
Luxemburg [LU], Lithuania <, Malta [MT], the Netherlands [NL], Poland [PL],
Portugal [PT], Slovenia [SI] and Slovakia [SK]). The principle aim of the sur-
vey is to monitor the financial behaviour of households in the Eurozone,
ranging from incomes and expenditures on food, housing, energy, mobility,
luxury products, to savings and investments in various forms (bonds, stocks,
valuables, etc.). Although the survey is designed to keep an eye on the
effects of the central banks’ policies on the economy, the inclusion of sev-
eral housing-related variables make the data very useful for housing market
analyses. Whereas the total sample draws on 50,000 households, those with
higher incomes are slightly overrepresented. To overcome the issue of item
non-response, and to reduce standard errors, the ECB provides five imputa-
tions. The results presented below are calculated with Stata’s multiple
imputation package, which generated an average of the coefficients and
adjusted standard errors across all five imputations in order to ensure the
accuracy of the results.
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Secondary property ownership rates
SPO is operationalised as the ownership, in addition to the household’s pri-
mary residence, of one or more residential dwellings. Among the 20 coun-
tries included in the survey, SPO rates are highest in Finland, Luxemburg,
Cyprus, Spain and Estonia, in all of which more than 20% of households
own one or more secondary properties in addition to their primary resi-
dence (see Figure 1). These include countries with a tradition of second
homes such as summer cottages (other Scandinavian countries display simi-
lar results [see Skak & Bloze, 2017]), or countries that are characterised by
rapid urbanisation and a family-oriented housing regime. While there are
some countries, notably the Netherlands and Slovenia, with quite low rates,
the median is 14.5%. Taking account of the different population sizes of dif-
ferent countries, as well as the absence of some EU-countries in the survey,
notably the United Kingdom, it seems not unreasonable to conclude that
around 15% of EU-households are secondary property owners. In numerical
terms alone, therefore, SPO constitutes a not insignificant dimension of the
total housing circumstances of EU households and this alone creates con-
siderable potential to contribute to asset-based welfare.
The value of secondary properties
Whereas the numbers are themselves relevant, arguably more so is the fact
that many secondary properties will be marketable and therefore have mar-
ket values that constitute financial assets for individual owners. Figure 2
shows the contribution of secondary property wealth to the total housing
wealth in selected EU countries. Secondary property wealth is operational-
ised as the self-assessed market value of the property minus any
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Secondary Property Ownership in 20 EU countries
Figure 1. Secondary property ownership (SPO) rates in 20 European (EU) countries.
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outstanding residential mortgage debts. Total housing wealth is operation-
alised using the same procedure while taking all housing units into account
(primary residences and secondary properties). The results indicate that on
average, secondary property wealth constitutes a considerable share of
total housing wealth in all countries under observation. This confirms the
expectation that secondary properties do not comply with the stereotypical
small and cheap holiday home: instead they represent a significant source
of wealth. Logically, the share of secondary property wealth in total housing
wealth is lowest in countries with the lowest rates of secondary property
ownership such as The Netherlands, Slovakia and Poland. Secondary prop-
erty wealth generally takes up a larger share of total housing wealth hold-
ings in countries with higher SPO rates. Interestingly, across the board, the
contribution of secondary property wealth to total housing wealth is larger
than the share of secondary property owners among homeowners. We
point at two explanations. First, a relatively small group of secondary prop-
erty owners owns a larger real-estate portfolio, representing a far higher
value than the primary residence. Second, whereas primary residences are,
at least in North-western Europe often financed with mortgages – limiting
housing equity, secondary properties are more often owned outright.
Landlordism in Europe
Central to the actual contribution of SPO to asset-based welfare, however,
are the motives underlying ownership. Either, households buy secondary
properties for consumption purposes, or for investment purposes (rent- or
wealth investments). Unfortunately, the survey does not provide a direct
means of identifying all categories of SPO, for example distinguishing
between second homes used for family holidays and second homes as
safety deposit boxes. It does however enable the identification of the
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Figure 2. Secondary property wealth.
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incidence of landlordism among secondary property owners, which is oper-
ationalised as ownership of two or more housing units, with the household
being in receipt of rental income.
The HFCS data show that there is a high share of landlords among sec-
ondary property owners in Ireland, Belgium, Germany, France and
Luxemburg (see Figure 3). In these countries, more than half of secondary
properties are let, with the lead taken by Germany where nearly 80% of sec-
ondary properties are being let. These countries can be split into two
groups (Figure 3). One group includes the conservative-corporatist welfare
states of France, Belgium, Luxemburg and Germany, characterised by occu-
pationally-fragmented pension provision systems. Austria is the only con-
servative-corporatist welfare with a slightly lower share of landlords among
secondary property owners. A second group includes the only liberal wel-
fare state in the data (Ireland), although from other sources (e.g., Gardiner,
2017) the United Kingdom could also be included as anecdotal evidence
shows that at least 50% of the secondary properties are let. In both Ireland
and the United Kingdom, the public first-tier pension is flat-rate and ungen-
erous. In both countries, statutory second-tier arrangements are largely
absent, with only a privileged part of the workforce covered by (private)
occupational welfare arrangements (Berry, 2016). In line with older work
reporting on similarities regarding the ‘passive’ homeownership-public pen-
sions trade-off in Ireland and Belgium (e.g., De Decker & Dewilde, 2010;
Delfani et al., 2015; Fahey, 2003), both countries are also situated near each
other in Figure 3: both are characterised by high outright homeownership
Figure 3. Secondary property ownership and landlordism.
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rates among the elderly to compensate for ungenerous public first-tier pen-
sions (be it flat-rate in ‘liberal’ Ireland and earnings-related in ‘conservative-
corporatist’ Belgium) and limited second-tier pension provision. Whilst both
are ‘homeownership countries’, in Ireland homeownership promotion has
been of a more ‘universalistic’ (redistributive) nature than in Belgium, where
public subsidies continue to explicitly favour middle- to high-income
households (Heylen, 2015; Norris, 2016). Although Belgium is a bit of an
outlier with regard to its specific combination of the welfare and housing
systems (compared with other conservative-corporatist welfare state it does
not have a larger and more strictly regulated rental market), the housing
system can nevertheless be denoted as ‘conservative’ (though perhaps less
corporatist than in comparison to, for instance, Germany and the
Netherlands) as the housing system strengthens the outcomes of the
labour market.
In contrast to these two groups, in all other countries with medium rates
of secondary property ownership, but lower levels of landlordism, second-
ary properties are predominantly vacant or used by the family, as holiday
homes or to house other members of the extended family. This includes
the Mediterranean countries (Spain, Italy, Malta, Greece and Cyprus), post-
socialist countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovenia), and the only
representative of the Scandinavian countries: Finland (Roca, 2016). Similarly
low levels of landlordism among secondary property owners can be
expected in the other Nordic countries (Skak & Bloze, 2017).
Accounting for patterns of landlordism: housing systems
How can this pattern be explained: why do households in countries with
conservative-corporatist and possibly liberal regimes disproportionately rent
their secondary properties? One avenue of investigation is founded in the
proposition that a key is to be found in the nature of housing systems. They
can be described through the pattern of regulation, taxes and subsidies that
contribute to the shape of opportunities faced by households. Among other
things these opportunities impact upon the balance between social and pri-
vate rental housing and homeownership. At the same time it is important to
stress a caveat that may limit the significance of the explanations based on
housing systems, namely that the survey is of households, not of housing
stock, so that it is possible for some households to own secondary properties
located in countries different from the location of their primary residence.
Homeownership
Insofar as one can only own a secondary property if one also owns a pri-
mary residence, it might be expected that countries with high rates of
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homeownership would also have high levels of SPO. Indeed, we find a sig-
nificant positive relationship between SPO and homeownership rates in the
20 countries under observation (Figure 4, R¼ 0.24, P< 0.05). Countries with
higher homeownership rates tend to have somewhat higher levels of sec-
ondary property ownership as well. To a certain extent this means that
institutional arrangements that promote homeownership also translate into
significant incentives to own secondary properties. We point at three pos-
sible explanations why there is no stronger relationship between home-
ownership rates and secondary property ownership rates. First, not all
arrangements aimed at increasing homeownership are available for those
who want to purchase secondary property ownership. The United Kingdom,
Denmark, France, Belgium, Sweden and the Netherlands have (had) mort-
gage interest tax deduction, only available for primary residences (Donner,
2000). In countries with stricter planning systems, public authorities provide
space for the construction of primary residences rather than secondary
properties, especially in times of housing shortage. However, in Germany (a
country with low homeownership rates), secondary property ownership is
made financially advantageous, as landlordism reduces the shortage of
housing (Kemp & Koffner, 2010). Second, secondary properties might be
located in foreign countries (especially countries of origin and along the
Mediterranean coast), which means that international rather than domestic
frameworks play a role (Roca, 2016). Third, in countries with widespread
homeownership, opportunities for letting out properties are limited as only
the most marginalised are willing to rent, representing a financial risk
for landlords.
Figure 4. Secondary property ownership rate and homeownership rates (as percent-
age of the total population) in 20 European (EU) countries.
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Rental sectors
Figure 5 shows a significant positive association (R2¼ 0.43) between the
size of the rental sector and the percentage of secondary property owners
engaging in landlordism. Generally speaking, in countries with a larger ren-
tal sector, a higher percentage of secondary property owners use their
property to generate rental income. Whereas it is possible for households
to own and let dwellings located in another country, this result is consistent
with the proposition that in practice most are located in the same country.
Following this, landlordism seems to be favoured by at least two different
forms of housing market regulation. Firstly, landlordism is attractive in
countries with strict overall rent regulations. Although profits might be lim-
ited, investments may be stable and profitable due to tax discounts and
other subsidies for landlords, and the strong social profile of the tenants
(Bourassa & Hoesli, 2010). This strategy appears significant in a number of
corporatist-conservative welfare states, evidenced by the position of
Germany, France and Austria in the upper right-hand quadrant of Figure 5.
Secondly, in liberal welfare states, deregulated rents and deregulated hous-
ing finance sit alongside structurally inflated house prices, which impedes
the access of younger cohorts to homeownership, boosts the demand for
rental housing, and concentrates the housing wealth in the hands of sitting
owners, allowing them to use their wealth as collateral for new loans, used
to finance buy-to-let properties (Arundel, 2017). Gardiner (2017) shows that
this phenomenon is a major driver of the recent upswing of SPO in the
Figure 5. Size of the rental sector versus landlordism among secondary property
owners in 20 European (EU) countries.
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United Kingdom. Fitting with an apparent liberal regime grouping, Ireland
is accordingly located in the upper right-hand quadrant of Figure 5.
Accounting for patterns of landlordism: welfare regimes
Although the nature of national housing systems, at least the size of rental
sectors, appears to influence the pattern of SPO as landlordism, a second
avenue of investigation, based on identifying correlations between land-
lordism rates and forms of welfare provision, arguably provides greater
explanatory power.
Employment status
The starting point of the argument here lies with evidence that self-
employed people are more likely than salaried workers to own secondary
property in the form of rental dwellings (Lohmann 2009). Our analysis is
limited to the working-age population (below 65 years old), as the HFCS
does not provide retrospective information on occupational status. Table 1
shows that SPO is much more common among self-employed than among
salaried workers. For some self-employed, landlordism is their main eco-
nomic activity, but for most it is a side activity. When the survey results are
compared for countries with high rates of landlordism – Belgium, France
and Germany – they indicate that self-employed workers are much more
likely than salaried workers to let their secondary property or properties). In
Luxembourg and Ireland landlordism is equally common for both groups of
Table 1. Secondary property ownership and landlordism among salaries workers
and self-employed in 20 European (EU) countries.
Secondary property ownership (%
of population)
Landlordism (% of secondary
property owners)
Salaried workers Self-employed Salaried workers Self-employed
BE 12% 26% 39% 52%
DE 13% 30% 60% 73%
FR 15% 32% 37% 55%
IE 11% 20% 66% 65%
LU 19% 44% 45% 44%
CY 22% 34% 38% 35%
EE 25% 32% 8% X
ES 23% 37% 19% 24%
FI 18% 41% 27% 37%
GR 12% 13% 26% 33%
HU 14% 23% 13% 21%
IT 12% 22% 25% 29%
SI 14% 18% 14% X
LV 21% 38% 9% X
MT 18% 25% 13% X
PT 14% 28% 26% 30%
Note: Results based on low cell fill (below 60) are censored. Source: HFCS (2015), own calculations.
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workers, an outcome that suggests that landlordism might have different
drivers in liberal welfare states than in a conservative-corporatist states. In
the former, it might be predominantly a strategy for those who may already
be reasonably well-off.
The impact of the pension system
Having identified that self-employed people appear to be disproportion-
ately more often the owners of secondary properties generating rental
incomes, our challenge here is to establish how this might be grounded in
national welfare systems, especially pension systems.
Whereas at a general level pension systems can be seen as a form of
horizontal redistribution over the life course (Salas & Rabadan, 1998), it is
clear that the generosity and structure of pension systems vary consider-
ably across Europe (OECD, 2011). On the basis of information from EU-SILC,
we have calculated ‘empirical’ average pension replacement rates by com-
paring current incomes of (1) the general population and (2) self-employed,
and comparing these with the incomes of their retired counterparts. Our
calculations show that income replacement rates are relatively low, that is
between 40% and 60%, in Ireland, Cyprus, Belgium and Malta, all of which
have small public mandatory first-tier pensions, and small (and varying)
second-tier pensions. Conservative-corporatist welfare states (except
for Belgium, see Delfani et al., 2015) are characterised by a multitude of
parallel second-tier occupational pension funds that preserve occupational
status after retirement. These countries have mediocre pension replace-
ment rates (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The highest replacement rates are
found in as Austria, Poland, Luxembourg and Hungary (between 65%
and 90%).
In nearly all countries, replacement rates for the self-employed after
retirement are much lower than those for employees. The gap is especially
large in some corporatist-conservative welfare states such as Germany,
Finland and France, in which the self-employed are not included in the
occupational pension funds. In Cyprus, Ireland, Germany and Slovenia, the
self-employed face the lowest income replacement rates (between 30%
and 45%); in contrast, they face the highest income replacement rates in
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Slovakia and Hungary (between 60% and 85%).
In Figure 6, countries are positioned on the basis of their pension generos-
ity for the self-employed, and the percentage of landlords among self-
employed secondary property owners. The four countries with the highest
percentage of landlords among self-employed secondary property owners –
Belgium, Germany, France and Ireland – are among those countries with the
lowest pension replacement rates. Whereas pensions in Belgium and Ireland
are low across the board, in Germany and France pension replacement rates
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are much lower among self-employed compared to salaried workers. The
results are consistent with our proposition that the self-employed may dispro-
portionately engage in landlordism to compensate for their low incomes after
retirement in these countries. In Ireland, in contrast, secondary property own-
ership and landlordism is common among well-off workers. On the basis of
evidence from the United Kingdom, showing an upswing of landlordism
among housing wealth-rich households (Gardiner, 2017), one could assume
that similar trends occur generally in liberal welfare states.
In our analysis, there are three countries – Cyprus, Slovenia and Finland –
with comparably low pension replacement rates among the self-employed,
but in which landlordism among self-employed secondary property owners is
relatively uncommon. These are countries in which options for rental are rela-
tively limited, due either to universal homeownership or to a dominance of
corporate actors in the rental market. Luxemburg is the only country that
combines relatively high pension replacement rates among the self-employed
with high levels of landlordism among self-employed secondary property
owners, which suggests that rental incomes are received on top of relatively
generous pension benefits. Finally, there is a group of Mediterranean coun-
tries with moderately generous pension replacement rates, but low levels of
landlordism among self-employed secondary property owners.
Poverty relief
In a comparison of 20 EU countries, Lohmann (2009) concludes that the
“self-employed are a [… ] group with a higher pre-transfer poverty risk and
Figure 6. Landlordism versus pension replacement rates in selected countries.
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a lower probability that poverty will be reduced via transfers” (p. 497). In
line with our identification of two groups of countries with high landlord-
ism rates, the overrepresentation of self-employed in SPO and landlordism,
then, might be the result of (1) a welfare strategy to supplement low pen-
sion incomes, and (2) investment on top of generous pensions.
We investigate these possibilities by expressing rent revenues as a per-
centage of the gross income (net income is not available in the HFCS). We
compare two groups: those with an income below the poverty line, and
those with an income below the median income. Following Eurostat (2017),
the relative poverty threshold is defined as 60% of the national median
equivalised income. Figure 7 shows that rental incomes constitute a consid-
erable source of income for households that live below the poverty line
(based on their gross income). In those countries with high levels of land-
lordism (Germany, France, Luxemburg, Ireland and Belgium), rental reve-
nues boost the incomes of poor households with 15%–35%. In countries
with lower rates of landlordism, such as Italy, Spain and Portugal, these fig-
ures are even larger. Additionally, Figure 7 further indicates that rental
incomes boost the incomes of below-median income households by
10%–25% (somewhat less than among those living below the poverty line).
In a large number of cases, the rental revenues allow the landlords to pass
the median income threshold, and to afford a somewhat more ‘elevated’
life-style. The results provide evidence supporting the proposition that in
conservative-corporatist welfare states, the self-employed and those who
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Figure 7. Rental incomes of landlords as percentage of their gross income in selected
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are poorly covered by the pension system strongly rely on the revenues
from landlordism to sustain their livelihood after retirement.
To summarise, then, there are two country clusters with relatively high
levels of secondary property ownership in which secondary properties fulfil
different roles. First, there are countries in which landlordism is dominant.
In these countries (Germany, France, Luxemburg, Ireland and Belgium) land-
lordism mitigates old-age poverty for groups that are not well protected by
the welfare state, such as the self-employed. Landlordism has a different
driver for the corporatist-conservative welfare states (where landlordism
has been a common strategy to supplement a lower income in later life for
decades) and the liberal welfare states (where it is a relatively new phenom-
enon). In the latter, it is relatively skewed toward property speculation by
relatively wealthy, but not necessarily self-employed, homeowners already
supported by relatively generous pensions, whereas in the former landlords
are predominantly self-employed workers who are largely excluded by –
otherwise relatively generous – second-tier pension arrangements.
Discussion
Although the rate varies from country to country, and allowing for the par-
ticular sample available, our analysis suggests that, overall, around 15% of
households in the EU own secondary properties. Together, such properties
thus constitute a significant share of the total EU housing stock.
Furthermore, it can be expected that many will be tradable and thus have
market values. Again, there are large country differences. Even though they
might not, on average, have values as high as primary properties, they do
constitute a significant share of individual household – individual country –
and total EU housing wealth.
These figures point to a limitation of housing policy analysis that focuses
solely on primary residences, and especially analysis that attempts to link
the significance of housing assets, housing market behaviour, and the wider
political and economic environment. They also support the principal object-
ive of this paper of exploring the ways in which SPO relates to longstanding
debates in the housing studies literature summarised under the heading of
‘the really big trade-off’ between homeownership and pensions, and more
recent debates about asset-based welfare.
In pursuing this objective, the distinction between consumption and
investment motives is a useful starting point. However, this distinction is
not hard: for example, buyers of second homes intended for family holidays
may, at the same time, also be making an investment that will provide a
positive return. Nevertheless, the identification of SPO that produces rental
payments and, as such constitutes dwellings let by private individuals,
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brings together properties that are not intended for consumption by the
owner. In that sense it seems reasonable to view them as a sector of SPO
that is an investment, has a financial value as an asset, and contributes to
the wealth and spending power of owners. In turn, this has similarities with
the assets embedded in primary properties, and is thus potentially a factor
in both the trade-off and asset-based welfare.
The aim of our analysis, then, has been to use survey data, aggregated at
the country level, to identify which countries have a high rate of SPO used as
rental properties and which low, as the first step to accounting for that vari-
ation in terms that link with debates about a housing asset-welfare trade-off.
Examination of the co-occurrence of SPO and landlordism indicates a
number of country groupings. The majority of countries in our sample have
rather low proportions of their SPO sectors that are rented out and it seems
likely that many – especially those in the Mediterranean countries for
example – are heavily skewed toward consumption-led SPO in the form of
holiday homes or housing provision for the extended family. But, two groups
of countries stand out for their orientation toward landlordism among sec-
ondary property owners. First, it concerns countries with high levels of both
SPO and landlordism, namely Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg.
Second, it concerns countries with moderate levels of SPO but high rates of
landlordism in liberal countries such as Ireland (and presumably the United
Kingdom). Unfortunately the United Kingdom is absent from our data set,
but the evidence from elsewhere (Gardiner, 2017) supports a conclusion that,
in terms of welfare regime typologies, landlordism forms a major part of SPO
sectors in both liberal and conservative-corporatist regimes, but does not do
so in Mediterranean, social democratic and post-communist welfare regimes.
How can this pattern be explained and how does it relate to our concern
with the literature about trade-off and asset-based welfare? One avenue of
investigation is founded in the proposition that a key is to be found in the
nature of housing systems, even while recognising that the incidence of
SPO is related to households rather than national housing stocks.
Nevertheless, it might be expected that countries with high rates of
homeownership would also have high levels of SPO, because one can only
own a secondary property if one also owns a primary residence. But, our
evidence indicates that at the country level the two are not related. It might
also be expected that landlordism will be high as a proportion of SPO in
countries in which the housing system supports large rental sectors. Here,
the relationship is positive and significant, and, moreover, the cluster of
conservative-corporatist regime countries – Germany, France, Austria,
Luxembourg but less so Belgium – is again identifiable.
Another avenue of investigation, one that arguably provides greater
leverage on our trade-off and asset-based welfare interests, is based on
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exploring correlations between landlordism and measures of welfare. The
key observation here is that in countries where there is a high share of
landlords among SPO, a high proportion of SPO is held by people who are
self-employed. The significance of this lies in the fact that in many coun-
tries, especially among those with corporatist-conservative welfare systems,
self-employed people have less generous pension arrangements than those
who are employed. In fact, the stream of rent that landlords get from their
properties appears to lift many out of poverty. This supports a conclusion
that especially in conservative-corporatist countries, those who are self-
employed and poorly covered by national pension systems, strongly rely on
the revenues from landlordism to supplement their incomes.
In contrast, in liberal regimes where landlordism has recently increased
significantly it appears to be related less to self-employment, and exclusion
from pension provision but may rather be a strategy adopted by relatively
high wealth homeowners further enhancing their wealth through property
investment. In these countries, the inaccessibility of homeownership for
younger households (with a lower socio-economic status) pushes many to
become tenants and puts housing-wealth-rich households in a favourable
position to diversify their wealth portfolio.
Conclusion
There are a number of general conclusions that can be drawn from these
findings. Firstly, welfare states do not protect different social and occupa-
tional groups equally well against the risks of income loss in old age. This
has been extensively argued with respect to the position of women in
many welfare systems (Mandel, 2012; Orloff, 1993). This argument can be
extended to some self-employed people, as they have been treated less
favourably as well (Lohmann, 2009). Welfare state arrangements are the
outcome of a democratic class struggle, in which labour unions have aimed
to preserve and protect the socio-economic status of employees (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). In many cases, the self-employed face less social protec-
tion, as they are considered employers rather than employees, despite their
income level. Therefore, in corporatist-conservative welfare states with gen-
erally well-developed social insurance systems, the self-employed mainly
rely on public first-tier pension arrangements. They are barely included in
occupation-based and fragmented publicly-mandated second-tier pension
arrangements due to the stratified, salary-based nature of the system.
Whereas it is common for salaried workers in corporatist-conservative wel-
fare states to opt for rental housing as they have their pensions arranged
collectively, previous research did not point out how this alleged macro-
level trade-off between homeownership and pensions affects the self-
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employed. The results show that the self-employed might opt for home-
ownership and landlordism, as they are not included in these collective
arrangements. Their rental income is a large share of their pension, whereas
those who are well included in the system occupy the properties they let.
Secondly, many discussions about asset-based welfare and about the
‘really big trade-off’ have focused on the position of homeowners. Our ana-
lysis provides further evidence that the rental income from secondary proper-
ties also has potential to influence people’s welfare position and thereby to
figure in their wider strategising. For those with small second-tier pension
arrangements, rental income may be an essential supplement to the old-age
income, especially in corporatist-conservative welfare states. Another type of
SPO that is less related to the provisioning of welfare has gained importance
recently: especially in liberal welfare states, with unregulated rental markets,
those who have profited from rising house prices invest in buy-to-let proper-
ties. A share of these investments can be considered as intergenerational sup-
port from parents to children whose opportunities to enter homeownership
are diminished due to house price surges. Another share of these investments
is purely speculative. As most of the housing-wealth-rich households that
invest in rental properties are well covered by second-tier pension arrange-
ments, their rental incomes can be considered a general investment strategy,
or at most as a supplement to third-tier pensions.
Thirdly, landlordism appears to have been a linchpin in the conservative-
corporatist welfare regime from the outset, providing a crucial means
whereby the needs of two groups of citizens could be met: those in need
of a stable income flow in old age (the self-employed), and those in search
of affordable rental housing (employed workers). Whereas the surge of buy-
to-let seems to be a recent and current trend in advanced economies, it is
especially the speculative (Anglo-Saxon) form that is new. However, this form
is not limited to Anglo-Saxon countries. In other countries with comparable
house price gains, such as the Netherlands, a similar upswing of speculative
buy-to-let can be witnessed (Aalbers et al., 2018). The traditional form of SPO
and landlordism has been a feature of conservative-corporatist welfare states
for many decades. The sustainability of the traditional buy-to-let model in
the corporatist-conservative welfare states depends on house price gains
that might incentivise housing-wealth-rich individuals to enter the market,
and the stability of the income of salaried workers (determining the
demand), and the self-employed (determining the traditional supply).
Finally, future research, based on more robust data, should determine
the importance of rental income for the self-employed in a wider range of
situations, as both buy-to-let landlordism and self-employment increase
rapidly (Barbieri, 2009). Many ‘new’ forms of self-employment are however
more precarious than before, and might not allow these new groups to
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proactively invest in secondary property as a strategy to complement future
pension income with a rental income stream (De Deken, 2018). The HFCS
data used in this paper could not shed light on these issues due to several
shortcomings, related to its one-sided focus on the financial behaviour of
households in the Eurozone. First, the sample contains a relatively small
group of secondary owners and self-employed. Second, the survey does
not include many questions about the housing practices of secondary prop-
erty owners. As landlordism appears to have different drivers in liberal and
conservative-corporatist welfare states, it is essential to include the motives
for owning secondary properties in the analysis (e.g., intergenerational sup-
port, pension arrangement, general investment). Third, to shed light on the
trade-off between homeownership/secondary property ownership and pen-
sion generosity on the micro level, more information is needed on the indi-
vidual pension savings and expected generosity of second-tier pension
schemes. Finally, more detailed information on housing tenure (e.g., distin-
guishing social rental housing from private rental housing provided by
small-scale and professional landlords), would allow to better map the
social profile of the tenants living in secondary properties bought as rental
investment. Nevertheless, secondary property ownership may increasingly
become a marker of economic inequality, deserving more attention from
housing scholars and policy makers.
Note
1. First-tier pensions are generally publicly provided through Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) schemes
in which the current working population provides current retirees with a pension, aimed at
the prevention of poverty during old age. Second-tier pensions are generally publicly
mandated (private) funds in which employees collectively save for their pension in order to
prevent income falls after retirement. Third-tier pensions are private schemes through
which individuals can save for supplementary pensions (De Deken, 2018).
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